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This paper argues that despite pressures to conform to the research methodology of 
the social sciences, African philosophers must diligently work for the preservation of 
the distinct character of philosophy as a discipline. To do this, they will have to move 
away from the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy, and focus 
their efforts on the quest for a criterion by which to distinguish philosophical works 
from non-philosophical ones, regardless of where the works hail from. They will also 
have to be busy engaging in other aspects of philosophical reflection, so that their 
discipline may grow in an all-rounded manner, and so that the research methodology 
of philosophy may be manifest to scholars from other disciplines. Only then will 




In our day, the social sciences enjoy great prestige in academia and in society at large. 
This is understandable, as many thinkers, impressed by the great accomplishments of 
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the natural sciences, endeavour to attain corresponding achievements in studies of 
human individuals and societies. The tremendous influence of the social sciences is 
evident in the fact that it has become almost customary for scholars and social 
activists to demand “facts and figures” whenever a claim is made about an economic, 
social or political issue. While this approach encourages a considerable amount of 
objectivity in the endeavour to understand the causes and nature of such problems, it 
has also resulted in the unwarranted assumption that all disciplines must employ the 
empirical methodology of the natural and social sciences. Thus traditional distinctions 
between the humanities and the social sciences are in danger of being blurred, as the 
humanities such as philosophy, fine art and literature are put under pressure to employ 
the methodology of the social sciences. 
 
I was first struck by the dominance of the social sciences when, over twenty years 
ago, I sat in an academic staff seminar in which post-graduate students of philosophy 
presenting research proposals were taken to task for not having stated their 
hypotheses, and for not including questionnaires - requirements which presuppose 
that the students would be engaged in empirical research. The students were taken to 
task for these “omissions” despite the fact that they had clearly indicated that their 
proposed studies would be undertaken through library research. Recently, I have even 
heard senior African practitioners of philosophy and others of religion asserting that 
there is no real distinction between philosophy and religious studies! The backdrop to 
this claim is that in several universities, for reasons of financial  prudence, the two 
disciplines are housed in one department. Yet the fact is that if a department housing 
both philosophy and religious studies were to re-package its course units with a view 
to merging the content of the two disciplines, the resulting units would be reminiscent 
of the sterility of the mule - they would be neither philosophy nor religious studies 
units. This becomes clearer when we consider that while philosophy is characterised 
by reflection, the study of religion entails either an empirical investigation of specific 
religions (“religious studies”), or a systematic exposition of the teachings contained in 
a specific “holy book” such as the Bible or the Qur’an (“theology”). 
 
This paper argues that despite pressures to conform to the research methodology of 
the social sciences, African philosophers must diligently work for the preservation of 
the distinct character of philosophy as a discipline. To do this, they will have to move 
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away from the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy, and focus 
their efforts on the quest for a criterion by which to distinguish philosophical works 
from non-philosophical ones, regardless of where the works hail from. They will also 
have to be busy engaging in other aspects of philosophical reflection, so that their 
discipline may  grow in an all-rounded manner, and so that the research methodology 
of philosophy may be manifest to scholars from other disciplines. Only then will 
philosophy make its unique contribution to interdisciplinary research in Africa and 
beyond. The paper proceeds from the realisation that “on the one hand, subjects can 
basically stipulate methods, and on the other, a certain subject can only reveal itself in 
an appropriate method” (Peng and Cheng 2006, 450). 
 
From the outset, it is important to bear in mind that there is no consensus on the 
understanding of the meaning of “research”. Even a limited survey of the usage of the 
term is enough to show that it is applied to activities as varied as the study of form 
and content of literature, the authentication of historical documents, the derivation of 
mathematical formulas, the development of technical models and prototypes, the 
collection and analysis of data in experiments and surveys, and the formulation of 
laws and theories, and much else (Nagi and Corwin 1972, 1). Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to gainsay the fact that research has something to do with the acquisition or 
creation of new knowledge through a specific strategy for investigation. It is this 
strategy that we refer to as methodology. According to Spirkin (1983), a methodology 
is a system of principles and general ways of organising and structuring theoretical 
and practical activity, and also the theory of this system. According to the most 
common classification, there are philosophical, general scientific, and special 
scientific methods (Spirkin 1983). 
 
It is also crucial to note that philosophy is one of the humanities, that is, the liberal 
arts such as fine art and literature. As such, a discussion of its present challenge must 
include some mention of the predicament of the humanities in general. What Bloom 
(1968, 357) noted is still largely true today, that “While both social science and 
humanities are more or less willingly awed by natural science, they have a mutual 
contempt for one another, the former looking down on the latter as unscientific, the 
latter regarding the former as philistine. They do not cooperate. And most important, 
they occupy much of the same ground. Many of the classic books now part of the 
90 Reginald M.J. Oduor 
  
humanities talk about the same things as do social scientists but use different methods 
and draw different conclusions; and each of the social sciences in one way or another 
attempts to explain the activities of the various kinds of artists in ways that are 
contrary to the way they are treated in the humanities. The difference comes down to 
the fact that social science really wants to be predictive, meaning that man is 
predictable, while the humanities say that he is not.” 
 
The paper is divided into three main sections. First, I argue that the debate on the 
nature of African philosophy is ultimately a controversy between universalism and 
particularism, and that subscribing to universalism is the only way to secure the 
contribution of African philosophy in the global marketplace of ideas. Second, I 
examine the distinct research methodologies of philosophy and of the social sciences, 
with a view to illustrating the need for the two fields of study to respect each other’s 
approaches in order to promote genuine interdisciplinary work. Third, I interrogate 
the idea of “interdisciplinarity” in the commercialised academic milieu of 
contemporary Africa, with special reference to its potential benefits and latent 
dangers. The paper concludes that while genuine interdisciplinary research might 
yield useful insights for all involved, scholars of philosophy must guard against a 
counterfeit interdisciplinary venture which results in philosophy’s loss of identity, and 
with it the loss of its unique contribution to the growth of human knowledge. 
 
2. Universalism: The Only Hope for African Philosophy 
The question of the nature of African philosophy has occupied African and Africanist 
scholars for more than half a century now. Scholars categorise trends in contemporary 
African philosophy in varying ways. For example, Imbo (1997) adopts a tripartite 
scheme, distinguishing among the universalists (Wiredu, Hountondji, Bodunrin, 
Odera-Oruka), the ethnophilosophers (Tempels, Senghor, Mbiti, Kagame) and those 
who take a hermeneutical approach (Towa, Okolo, Serequeberhan). Vest (2009) 
speaks of Ethnophilosophy, Excavationist, Professional, Cultural, and Sage 
philosophy. 
 
Nevertheless, some kind of orthodoxy has developed around the four trends in 
contemporary African philosophy identified by the late Prof. H. Odera Oruka  (1990, 
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13 ff.)as ethnophilosophy (the collective thought of indigenous African communities), 
nationalist-ideological philosophy (writings of African statesmen in which they 
present their thoughts on the socio-political direction the continent ought to take), 
professional philosophy (undertaken by African scholars trained through a Western-
type education system) and philosophic sagacity (the original and critical thoughts of 
individual African thinkers highly conversant with their indigenous cultures, and who 
have not gone through the modern school system). It is not our intention to give an 
exposition of the nature of these four trends, as this has already been ably done by 
Prof. Oruka and many after him (see for example Masolo 1994; Ochieng’ 1997). 
 
Whatever direction the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy takes 
in future, it will be fruitful to bear in mind the caution given by Vest (2009) that to be 
busy with questions about the intellectual capabilities of African thinkers or the 
possible existence of philosophical resources in African cultures is to respond to 
perverse questions; and that to engage in academic dialogues implicitly or explicitly 
guided by a request or a felt need to justify and defend the very possibility of African 
philosophy or African rationality is to engage in perverse and unnecessary dialogues. 
 
Reflection on the nature of African philosophy over the last five decades has 
demonstrated that one’s conception of African philosophy directly influences what 
one accepts as an adequate research methodology in the subject. As such, if two 
scholars with two different conceptions of African philosophy were to evaluate the 
research methodology of a third scholar with yet another conception, both the first and 
second scholar would very probably disagree with the third, and also with each other. 
While this kind of situation may be disturbing to anyone hankering for unanimity or 
uniformity, philosophy is characterised by debate  - which includes controversy about 
the nature of philosophy itself: “Philosophy, …, has this peculiarity, that reflection 
upon it is part of itself” (Collingwood 1933, 1). Consequently, the debate on the 
nature of African philosophy arises because of the word “philosophy” rather than 
“African” in the phrase. 
 
Ochieng’ (1997, 117 ff.) correctly observed that the debate on the nature of African 
philosophy can be conceptualised as a controversy between particularists and 
universalists. Particularists insist on the uniqueness of African philosophy, and 
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vigorously oppose any effort to judge it by parameters developed elsewhere in the 
world. On the other hand, universalists contend that knowledge cannot be limited by 
cultural contingencies, but must instead be assessed using objective criteria. It seems 
to me that African philosophers have two choices: to conceive philosophy as 
understood in the corridors of universities in other parts of the world, or to abandon it 
altogether. This is due to the fact that meaningful dialogue can only be carried out 
where there is a minimum set of criteria by which various participants in the dialogue 
can judge what they hear from fellow participants. The well known observation that 
relativism rests on an absolute postulate - that “everything is relative” - is relevant in 
this regard. Thus adopting universalism is far more preferable to abandoning 
philosophy altogether, because universalism secures the academic character of 
African philosophy by inviting philosophers from other parts of the world to interact 
with it on the basis of intellectual  values such as consistency, validity and objectivity. 
In short, African philosophy must be subjected to criticism alongside other 
philosophies. In this regard Wiredu has stated: 
To present African philosophy as an untouchable possession of 
Africans is to invite a touristic approach from its foreign audiences. If 
the philosophies may not be evaluated as false, they may not be 
evaluated as true either. In that case they might merely be noticed as 
cultural curiosities (Wiredu 1998). 
 
While universalism, as espoused in the previous paragraph, is considered neo-
colonialist in certain circles, the fact is that the very word philosophy is derived, not 
from the Ndebele, Ngoni, Kikuyu, Luba, Igbo, Akan or any other African language, 
but from Greek - a European language. As such, to insist on holding on to the word 
while giving it a totally new meaning is to engage in an evident inconsistency that 
issues from indecisiveness. Furthermore, one wonders why there has been no 
agitation for African mathematics, African physics or African chemestry, and yet 
more than half a century has been spent debating the nature of African philosophy as 
a distinct field of study. One also wonders why those who agitate for African 
philosophy as totally distinct from other philosophies still eagerly receive degrees on 
the subject, yet the conferring of such credentials is itself an import from the West. 
 
Thus while we Africans must assert our cultural identity, we must shake off the 
illusion that cultures are watertight compartments. As Hountondji famously observed, 
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“Cultural values are like venerial diseases: they flourish here and there, develop in 
one place rather than another according to whether the environment is more or less 
favourable; but this purely historical accident cannot justify any claim to ownership 
or, for that matter, to immunity” (Hountondji 1983, 177). Consequently, those who 
teach African philosophy must help their students to appreciate the fact that “a course 
in African philosophy is first and foremost a course in philosophy, albeit dealing with 
problems arising out of the African context” (Imbo 1997). 
 
Some of the feverish debate on the nature of African philosophy is due to turf battles, 
and such battles are common to all disciplines (Szmatka and Lovaglia 1996, 396). Yet 
there is an urgent need for African philosophers to engage in the quest for a criterion 
for distinguishing philosophical works from non-philosophical ones, regardless of 
where the works hail from. Failure to do so because of half a century of preoccupation 
with debate on the nature of African philosophy has exposed African philosophy, and 
in effect all philosophy, to undue pressure from other disciplines, and particularly 
from the social sciences. Consequently, although debate on the existence and nature 
of African philosophy is part and parcel of philosophical reflection and intellectual 
decolonisation (Wiredu 1998), African scholars of philosophy must now resolutely re-
orientate the bulk of their inquiries to other aspects of philosophy, that is, 
investigating perplexing questions that arise from considerations of various facets of 
reality. We urgently need many more treatises on logic, epistemology, axiology and 
metaphysics, hailing from Africa, taking cognisance of the history of the various 
branches of philosophy, and enriching the discourses with insights from the unique 
history and cultures of African peoples. 
 
3. Research Methodology in Philosophy and in the Social Sciences 
In view of the current trend towards interdisciplinary studies, it is important to 
distinguish between the methodology of philosophy and that of the social sciences, as 
this will clarify the nature and limit of co-operation between the two fields. Take, for 
example, politics as an area of inquiry: while philosophy studies political philosophy, 
the social sciences study political science, history of political thought, sociology of 
politics and political psychology, among others. What, then, is the essential difference 
in approach between these two fields? The brief answer is that philosophy undertake 
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sits investigations from a reflective point of view, while the social sciences pursue 
theirs from an empirical stance. This section examines at some depth the differences 
in approach between these two fields of study. This will hopefully serve as 
groundwork for the discussion in the subsequent section, where we shall be 
examining the potential benefits and dangers of interdisciplinary studies in Africa 
today, with specific reference to the place of philosophy in such collaborative 
endeavours. 
 
3.1. The Reflective Character of Philosophical Enquiry 
At least since Socrates, philosophy and the humanities devolving from it have 
considered themselves not only as a quest for theoretical knowledge, but also a pursuit 
of wisdom - and wisdom entails not only knowing what there is, but most of all 
knowing how to comport ourselves with respect to it (Kohák 1993, 240). As Berlin 
(1962, 4) pointed out, the two well known categories of academic investigation are 
empirical observation (employed by the natural and social sciences) and formal 
deduction (employed by mathematics). Nevertheless, observed Berlin, besides these 
two major categories of knowledge, there arise questions which fall outside either 
group, and these are the ones which can be said to be truly philosophical. 
 
The idealist British philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet, indicated what is implied in a 
“philosophical theory”, as distinguished from theories which make no claim to being 
philosophical: 
The primary difference is, that a philosophical treatment is the study of 
something as a whole and for its own sake. In a certain sense it may be 
compared to the gaze of a child or of an artist. It deals, that is, with the 
total and unbroken effect of its object. It desires to ascertain what a 
thing is, what is its full characteristic and being, its achievement in the 
general act of the world. History, explanation, analysis into cause and 
conditions, have value for it only in so far as they contribute to the 
intelligent estimation of the fullest nature and capabilities of the real 
individual whole which is under investigation (Bosanquet 1923, 1-2). 
 
As Bosanquet alludes above, philosophy refrains from limiting itself to empirical 
data. Concerning this Maritain wrote: 
Philosophy appeals to the facts, the data of experience. To obtain the 
necessary materials it uses as instruments the truths provided by the 
evidence of the senses and the conclusions proved by the sciences. It 
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depends on both, as a superior who cannot do his own work depends 
on the servants he employs. …. He therefore judges by his own light of 
whatever his servants bring him to supply his needs. For example, one 
of the most successful students of bees, Francois Huber, who was 
blind, interpreted by the light of his intellect the facts seen by his 
servants’ eyes (Maritain 1979, 88-89). 
 
Seeing that philosophy is neither a natural nor a formal science, what kind of research 
methodology does it employ? The simple answer to this question is reflection, which 
literally means “thinking again”. When one is engaged in reflection, one is 
reconsidering a belief or a judgment which one may have previously accepted without 
question, or without serious interrogation. Thus whereas most people simply make 
judgments about right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, and truth 
and falsehood, philosophers seek to understand the meaning and justification of such 
concepts. This is why it has often been said that the sole business of philosophers is 
the finding of problems in what most people take for granted (de Crespigny and 
Minogue 1976, pp.xiv-xv). 
 
In undertaking reflection,  philosophy has several techniques at its disposal, some of 
which are outlined below.1 While those readers who are professional philosophers 
might find the outline superfluous, it is necessary to include it here in view of the 
interdisciplinary nature of this journal. It is also helpful to bear in mind that there is 
considerable overlapping among the techniques elucidated below, so that they are 
identified as separate entities mainly for the purpose of enhancing clarity of thought 
about the methodology of philosophy. 
 
3.1.1. The Descriptive Technique 
To describe something is to portray, illustrate or depict it. In strict terms, the 
descriptive technnique is not part of the philosopher’s equipment, but rather that of 
the social scientist’s, who is keen to state the causes, nature and manifestations of 
social phenomena (see 3.2 below). Nevertheless, as alluded to in Maritain’s quotation 
above, philosophers consult studies by natural and social scientists on whatever 
                                                 
1 Some writers, such as Njoroge and Bennaars (1986), refer to the techniques as “methods of 
philosophical inquiry”. However, I take the view that the philosophical method is one, namely, 
reflection, and that reflection manifests in various ways, each of which is a technique. 
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phenomenon they wish to undertake reflection upon (Maritain 1979, 88-89). This 
ensures that they do not conduct their reflections in a vacuum. Those philosophers 
who choose to study ethnophilosophy and philosophic sagacity also use techniques 
normally associated with the social sciences, especially interviews. However, their 
use of such techniques is mainly for the purpose of gathering information on which to 
undertake philosophical reflection. We now turn to the techniques that are 
characteristic of philosophical reflection. 
 
3.1.2. The Phenomenological Technique 
The term phenomenology refers to the method of enquiry developed by the German 
philosopher, Edmund G.A. Husserl (1859-1938), following his own teacher, Franz 
Brentano (1838-1917). Husserl set out to develop the doctrine of phenomenology into 
a pure, non-empirical science. He presented a programme for the systematic 
investigation of consciousness and its objects. For him, it is of the essence of objects 
to be correlative to states of mind: no distinction can be made between what is 
perceived and the perception of it. Husserl contended that experience is not limited to 
apprehension through the senses, but includes whatever can be an object of thought 
(e.g. mathematical entities, moods, desires). For Husserl, the philosopher must begin 
from a scrupulous inspection of his or her own conscious, and particularly intellectual, 
processes. In this inspection all assumptions about the wider and external causes and 
consequences of these internal processes have to be excluded (“bracketed”). Although 
this sounds like a programme for a psychology of introspection, Husserl insisted that 
it was an a priori investigation of the essences or meanings common to the thought of 
different minds (see Husserl 1982; Passmore 1968, 466-503). 
 
The phenomenological technique is closely related to the perspective of the 
existentialists, who insist that abstract reflection as undertaken by traditional Western 
philosophy is fruitless, and that real philosophy must begin from the subject rather 
than the object, focusing on the individual’s perception of the world (see Cooper 
1999). The phenomenological technique aids the philosopher to appreciate the fact 
that whatever aspect of reality he or she chooses to reflect on, he or she cannot escape 
the subjective character of his or her inquiry. This technique also seems to be a bridge 
between the largely descriptive approach of the natural and social sciences on the one 
hand (see 3.2 below), and the abstract and reflective approach of philosophy on the 
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other. Besides, it seems to be a refinement of the descriptive technique, as it 
encourages an appreciation of the subjective element in any knowledge acquired 
through experience. 
 
3.1.3. The Speculative Technique 
In ordinary usage, to speculate is to wonder, conjecture, guess or to hypothesise. 
Speculation occurs where a particular kind of knowledge being sought is not 
available. While the natural and social sciences largely exclude speculation from their 
methodology, philosophy includes it. This is because as indicated by Berlin, 
Bosanquet and Maritain above, philosophy endeavours to transcend the empirical 
method of the natural and social sciences, as well as the formal method of 
mathematics. The speculative technique of philosophical reflection is most frequently 
manifested in philosophers’ attempts to solve metaphysical problems such as death, 
suffering and happiness, to which there are no simple answers (Njoroge and Bennaars 
1986, 26-27). Other topics that have required the speculative technique of 
philosophical reflection include reality and appearance, mind and matter, the one and 
the many, permanence and change, time and eternity, freedom and necessity, and 
unconscious mental states. 
 
The speculative technique is also employed in reflections on values (axiology). For 
example, in the quest for a just and workable political arrangement, the political 
philosopher begins by examining existing models, but then goes beyond them through 
the technique of speculation - he or she takes the liberty to create and examine models 
whose workings may not have been hitherto tested in practice. Thus when in The 
Republic Plato recommended a society wholly organised on the basis of his three 
levels of intellectual ability, he was drawing from the strict militaristic model of 
Sparta. However, he did not restrict himself to the Spartan model, since he placed 
intellectual ability at the centre of his own prescribed model, in sharp contrast to the 
Spartan model which emphasised physical endowment (see Plato 1945). 
 
3.1.4. The Prescriptive Technique 
To prescribe is to recommend or to set down as a rule or guide. We alluded to the 
prescriptive technique in the previous paragraph, when we pointed out that Plato’s 
speculations on the best form of government resulted in a recommendation of the rule 
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by an intellectual elite. In philosophy, prescription is undertaken in the study of 
axiology, that is, the theory of values. Included in the study of axiology are aesthetics, 
ethics, social philosophy and political philosophy. 
 
Philosophical reflection on values becomes necessary when people are no longer 
certain about what is important, worthwhile or valuable for their lives. Faced, for 
example, with conflicting moral standards or radically opposed ideologies, people 
need to think about the whole foundation of morality and of society. At this point 
philosophical reflection on values is unavoidable, even for the scientist (Njoroge and 
Bennaars 1986, 17). Some of the contemporary issues requiring the use of the 
prescriptive technique are such paradoxes as progress and poverty, scarcity in the 
midst of plenty, and over-production and under- consumption. Using a specific set of 
principles, the philosopher makes recommendations on how people ought to conduct 
themselves (ethics), or provides a justification for the existence of human beings in 
groups (social philosophy), or recommends the system of government which he or she 
thinks to be best suitable in a specific situation (political philosophy), or proposes 
what constitutes real beauty (aesthetics). 
 
3.1.5. The Analytical Technique 
The single most decisive difference between 20th-century philosophy and earlier 
epochs is the central role of logic and language in both the methods and the subject 
matter. This new era actually began in 1879, when Gottlob Frege revolutionized the 
subject of logic and effectively invented the philosophy of language (Searle 1999, 
2070). Consequently, Bertrand Russell's “On denoting” (1905) applied Frege's 
methods to the special problems of analysing sentences in ordinary language. Thus 
early in the twentieth century, there arose a philosophical movement which aimed to 
clarify language and analyze the concepts expressed in it. The movement was given a 
variety of designations, including “linguistic analysis”, “logical empiricism” and 
“logical positivism”. What was common to thinkers in this movement was their 
insistence that the main function of philosophy is analysis. Nevertheless, they 
disagreed radically about the nature of analysis, and also on the kind of information 
analysis gives us about the world. All the same, they were agreed that insofar as 
philosophical problems can be solved, it is through some sort of clarification of 
language (see Urmson 1956; Passmore 1968, 201-239, 343-366). 
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The analytic movement, with its focus on the nature and function of language, has left 
its mark on contemporary philosophers, who have considered the definition and use of 
various words in the contexts in which they appear. Philosophy is not contented to 
operate with old categories; rather, it recognises the need to throw new life into key 
words (Parmar 2000). In his celebrated essay, “Politics and the English Language”, 
George Orwell (1946) observed that “political language has to consist largely of 
euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.” Yet the need for 
clarification is not restricted to political language. There is need to clarify language in 
any field of knowledge before embarking on an assessment of the veracity of its 
claims. Through its emphasis on definition, the analytical technique focuses on the 
clarification of basic terms, thereby removing the kind of ambiguity and vagueness 
that Orwell lamented about, and facilitating precision in reflection and discussion. 
 
3.1.6. The Rational Technique 
The word “rational” evidently comes from the word “reason”. To reason is to provide 
grounds for a claim. The rational technique focuses on assessing the adequacy of the 
evidence upon which a claim is made. In other words, it is concerned with the logical 
connection, or lack of it, between the claims made and the grounds upon which those 
claims rest. Here insights from logic are crucial, since the central problem of logic is 
the distinction between correct and incorrect reasoning. The logician’s methods and 
techniques have been developed primarily for the purpose of making this distinction 
clear (Copi and Cohen 2005). 
 
For a collection of ideas to be termed a system, it must be internally consistent - its 
various components must fit into one another to form a coherent whole, thereby being 
free from contradiction. Thus the rational technique focuses on determining the extent 
to which people’s perspectives adhere to the basic rules of logical inference, such as 
the rule of identity and the rule of non-contradiction. 
 
3.1.7. The Critical Technique 
In its original meaning, the word “critical” implies “judging”, having been derived 
from the Greek verb krinein, literally denoting the act of judging. Indeed, the idea of 
weighing evidence and arriving at a conclusion, as a judge does in a court of law, is at 
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the core of the meaning of the term “criticism” as used in philosophy. The critical 
technique lays great emphasis on independent and original thinking. As Russell 
(1959, 6) observed, there are two attitudes that might be adopted towards the 
unknown: one is to accept the pronouncements of people who say they know on the 
basis of books, mysteries or other sources of inspiration; the other way is to go out 
and look for oneself, and this latter is the way of science and philosophy. 
 
Using the critical technique, philosophy evaluates things in the light of clear and 
distinct ideas, seeking to protect people from fanaticism, hypocrisy, intolerance, 
dogmatism, slogans and ideologies. In short, it aims at liberating people from narrow-
mindedness (Njoroge and Bennaars 1986, 23-24). Thus the critical technique focuses 
on the need to examine a claim from all possible perspectives, with a view to 
ascertaining its truth and/or applicability, with the highest degree of objectivity 
possible within the confines of human finitude and subjectivity. In this regard, the 
philosopher seeks to make a clear distinction between the way things appear to be and 
the way things are, and also between the way things are and the way they ought to be 
(Wambari 1992). Insights from epistemology (theory of knowledge) are crucial in this 
endeavour. 
 
Many philosophers consider the critical technique to be at the core of philosophical 
reflection. Thus when Wiredu (1980, 62) aserted that the task of philosophy is to 
examine the intellectual foundations of human life using the best available modes of 
knowledge and reflection for human well being, he seems to have been implying that 
philosophy is a critique of human thought. Peng and Cheng (2006) see both the 
analytical and rational techniques as being subsumed under the critical technique, as 
they assert that the critical technique examines language, thinking and reality. For 
them, the initial task of the critical technique is to delimit language so as to determine 
whether it is meaningful or not, and if it is meaningful, to explicate its meaning. On 
the basis of language, the philosopher must conduct a critique of thinking, With the 
aim of revealing its architectural structures, examining if the foundations are reliable, 
and whether or not its structure is contradictory. Through the critique of language and 
thinking, the philosopher must finally turn to the critique of reality (Peng and Cheng 
2006, 452-453). 
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3.2. The Empirical Research Methodology of the Social Sciences 
Social sciences are those disciplines that seek to apply the empirical approach of the 
natural sciences to the study of human groups and of interpersonal relationships in 
them. We must therefore have a clear understanding of the methodology of the natural 
sciences if we are to appreciate the approach of the social sciences. The word science 
is derived from the Latin word scire, denoting “to know”. Nevertheless, it is evident 
that the quest for knowledge is not the exclusive province of the natural and social 
sciences, since other fields of study such as mathematics and philosophy also seek to 
acquire knowledge. What is distinctive about the sciences, natural and social, is the 
methodology they employ in their quest for knowledge. 
 
Natural scientists undertake empirical investigations of specific phenomena in the 
material world, with a view to arriving at an accurate understanding of their causes, 
nature and function. They do so either to solve practical problems or simply to satisfy 
their intellectual curiosity ( Okasha 2002, 40). Among the well known natural 
sciences are biology, physics and chemistry. Perception is a fundamental tenet of the 
scientific approach (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 8). Definitions of the 
scientific method use such concepts as objectivity and acceptability. Objectivity 
indicates the attempt to observe things as they are, without falsifying observations to 
accord with some preconceived world view. On its part, acceptability is judged in 
terms of the degree to which observations and experimentations can be reproduced. 
 
In pursuit of objectivity and acceptability, the natural sciences insist that every 
research project include the identification of a problem, construction of hypotheses, 
testing of hypotheses, collection of data, statistical analyses of data, and the writing of 
a report that clearly and accurately presents the end-product of the preceding 
activities. As such, the distinctive characteristic of the research methodology of the 
natural sciences may be termed as refined observation, that is, the systematic and 
meticulous gathering of facts through the use of the senses. Whenever a branch of 
supposed factual knowledge is rejected by natural scientists, it is on the basis of its 
methodology. Thus science is not any general or particular body of knowledge; rather, 
it is distinct because of its methodology (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 4; 
Nagi and Corwin 1972, 2-3). 
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In contrast to the natural sciences, the social sciences are concerned with the origin, 
development, institutions and ideas involved in human groups (Doorne 2000). The 
social scientists assume that we human beings “are just as much part of nature as 
other natural objects, conditions, and phenomena and that, although we possess 
unique and distinctive characteristics, we can nevertheless be understood and 
explained by the same methods by which we study nature” (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1992, 7). Among the social sciences are anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, economics and political science. The methodology of the social sciences 
is greatly influenced by the work of August Comte (1798-1857), who gave an impulse 
to sociology conceived as a science or "social physics". He excluded revealed 
religion, and replaced it with humanism and ethics, based on history and aimed at the 
improvement of human conditions (see Comte 1968). 
 
In line with the methodology of the natural sciences, the social sciences emphasise the 
need for the systematic gathering, analyzing and presenting of empirical data. As 
such, they emphasise the need to use a research methodology that facilitates precision 
in the endeavour to describe social phenomena as accurately as possible. As 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992, p.vii) observe, Social science research is a 
cyclical, self-correcting process consisting of seven major interrelated stages - the 
research problem, the hypothesis, the research design, measurement, data collection, 
data analysis, and generalization. Each of these stages is interrelated with theory in 
that it both affects and is affected by it. 
 
The social sciences attach great importance to empirical techniques such as those of 
experiment and survey to gather relevant data about the causes and manifestations of 
various social phenomena such as prejudice, discrimination and crime. From such 
data, some of them have endeavoured to formulate theories that account for the 
interactions among various individual members and sub-groups in any society (see 
Wagley and Harris 1964, p.xiv). Social scientists often distinguish between 
quantitative and qualitative research, the former involving the gathering of statistical 
data, the latter entailing a more dynamic and therefore less structured approach to the 
gathering of information (Spirkin 1983). However, some social scientists insist that 
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the two approaches to research comprise a continuum rather than a dichotomy (see 
Newman and Benz 1998). 
 
Furthermore, the method of the social sciences, by virtue of being empirical, is highly 
descriptive. It endeavours to report things as they can be observed, and limits itself to 
those recommendations and theories that are directly implied by relevant 
observations. This approach is indispensable, because it is meaningless to speak of 
studying society in a vacuum. 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical approach of the social scientist has one main limitation - it 
does not allow the human mind to explore a problem beyond the data gathered and the 
theories employed to gather them. In other words, it largely reduces the human 
intellect to a processor of empirical data. It is a fact that the human mind engages in 
inductive reasoning of the kind dictated by empirical investigation - relevant 
information is gathered through the meticulous use of the senses, after which analyses 
are undertaken and reports written in which certain generalizations are made about the 
phenomena under investigation. Nevertheless, to assume that all that the human mind 
can do and ought to do is to analyse empirical data is to have a grossly limited 
understanding of the human intellectual potential. This is because the human mind 
can also undertake systematic reflection, as indicated in the previous subsection (3.1). 
 
Following August Comte, many social scientists have held the view that their 
disciplines have the potential to make great strides comparable to those of the natural 
sciences. Nevertheless, the limitation of applying the research methodology of the 
natural sciences to the realm of human society is illustrated by the history of the 
twentieth-century mutation of empiricism called logical positivism - the range of 
ideas characteristic of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 1930s. According to logical 
positivism's famous "verifiability principle", the meaning of a proposition consists in 
the method of its verification, that is, in whatever observations or experiences show 
whether or not it is true. Any proposition that is in principle unverifiable by 
observation is by fact devoid of meaning. Mathematics and logic, which are consistent 
with all observations, were admitted as meaningful at the cost of being tautological - 
They simply explicate the meanings of terms, telling us nothing about how things are 
in the world. 
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The "verifiability principle" was the basis of logical positivism's attack on 
metaphysics and axiology. At best, logical positivism claimed, the "pseudo-
propositions" of metaphysics, like those of ethics or aesthetics, could only be allowed 
to function as emotional expressions rather than statements of facts. Consequently, the 
task of philosophers was essentially that of elucidating meanings or calling attention 
to the lack of them rather than the presentation of philosophic doctrines (see Ayer 
1936; Bawden 1944). 
 
However, critics of logical positivism questioned the status of the verifiability 
principle itself. They asked: "Is the verifiability principle empirically verifiable or 
tautological?" The answer was that it was neither. It therefore followed, going by the 
reasoning of the logical positivists, that the verifiability principle itself was 
meaningless, so that it failed its own test! The principle turned out to be a 
metaphysical postulate rather than an assertion about two or more variables in the 
material world, and yet the logical positivists had rejected metaphysics as 
meaningless. Furthermore, there were serious problems about how to formulate the 
verifiability principle in order to exclude metaphysics without also excluding 
historical propositions, that cannot be conclusively verified by observation, yet they 
are certainly not meaningless. 
 
Besides, Karl R. Popper (1902-1994) recognised that to discard all metaphysics as 
meaningless as prescribed by logical positivism would make all knowledge, including 
scientific knowledge, impossible. He correctly noted that universal statements, such 
as very general scientific laws, are not empirically verifiable. He also pointed out that 
it is out of the imaginative conjectures about the world as carried out by metaphysics 
that science has emerged. For example, astronomy owes an enormous debt to 
astrology and mythology. Thus for Popper, the point of scientific investigation is not 
to reject metaphysical doctrines out of hand, but rather to attempt where possible to 
transform them into theories that can be empirically tested. Popper also insisted that 
although metaphysical doctrines cannot be tested scientifically, they can nonetheless 
be criticised, and reasons given for preferring one metaphysical opinion to another 
(see Popper 1959; 1962). 
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Such difficulties turned many philosophers of broadly empirical outlook away from 
logical positivism towards less dogmatic forms of linguistic and conceptual analysis. 
 
Thus while empiricism is the basis of the social sciences, its most basic postulate has 
been brought into serious question. Of course there are still evident benefits of 
employing the empirical method in studies of human societies, chief of which is that it 
ensures that scholars are in touch with things as they really are in the world. 
Nevertheless, in view of the serious challenges that empiricism faces, it is 
inadmissible for social scientists to seek to compel scholars of humanities to comply 
with the empirical approach to research. Instead, they must concede that the 
humanities have the right to use their own distinctive approaches. It is only then that 
interdisciplinary co-operation can be undertaken in an atmosphere of mutual respect. 
This leads us to an examination of the idea and practice of interdisciplinary studies. 
 
4. Philosophy, Interdisciplinarity and Market-driven Academics 
Research carried out in a particular time and place is greatly influenced by the social 
context (see Nagi and Corwin 1972). In the contemporary society, programmes 
designed to cope with problems such as those of ecology, demography, urbanisation, 
space exploration, and so on point to the need not only to pool the efforts of 
specialists in various fields, but also to combine scientific data in situations where 
there is in principle no complete or definite information about the object as a whole 
(Spirkin 1983). This partly explains the rise of interdisciplinary studies. Furthermore, 
increasingly complex societies are confronted by ethical dilemmas which require the 
thinking of scholars from various specialisations to address. In Kenya, for example, 
the 8-4-4 system of education introduced the “Social Education and Ethics” syllabus 
in an endeavour to ensure that students were equipped with social and moral skills 
regardless of their religious persuasion or lack of such persuasion. The programme 
had an interdisciplinary approach, drawing insights mainly from philosophy, 
sociology, psychology and history (see Oduor 1990). Thus when the University of 
Nairobi designed a curriculum to prepare teachers for the Social Education and Ethics 
syllabus in secondary schools, it relied on scholars in philosophy, religious studies 
and sociology to execute it. 
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Other instances of interdisciplinary inquiries are gender studies, environmental 
studies, disabilities studies and human rights studies, all of which draw their subject 
matter from the natural and social sciences, as well as from the humanities. For 
example, environmental studies include ecology as undertaken by biology, cultural 
studies in the tradition of the social sciences, and environmental ethics as investigated 
by philosophy. 
 
Nevertheless, interdisciplinarity and its implied antithesis, (intra)disciplinarity, defy 
absolute definition as intellectual concepts: their meanings are at best provisional and 
institutionally dependent, so that sometimes “interdisciplinary” merely means 
“interdepartmental” (Austin 1996, 272). Where “interdisciplinary” refers to 
substantive colaboration among various specialised fields, it requires the investigators 
to honor the assumptions, history, methods, and the current multiplicity of each 
discipline (Berg 1996, 276). Besides, a readiness to admit personal limitations is 
required from all involved, as it is difficult to work at a comparable level of 
knowledge and sophistication in more than one field so as to recognize possible 
intersections and parallels among the disciplines (Berg 1996, 277). Interdisciplinary 
study works because people from one discipline are not routinely bound by the same 
assumptions as people from another, so that they can often see through the 
assumptions that ground other disciplines so thoroughly that the assumptions have 
become invisible axioms (Torgovnick 1996, 282). 
 
4.1. Social Sciences versus Humanities: The Struggle for Hegemony 
In the information age, the natural sciences enjoy an almost unchallenged dominance 
in academia, because the material benefits of their work in fields such as agriculture, 
medicine, transport and communication is incontestible. It is also evident that there is 
a struggle for dominance between the social sciences and the humanities. The recent 
history of political philosophy lucidly illustrates the way in which the social sciences 
have sought to push philosophy and other humanities to the periphery of academia. 
After the 19th century, the methodology of the natural sciences began to be 
increasingly applied to other academic domains and gradually became dominant in 
these fields. Consequently, the almost hegemonic view was that the study of political 
issues must be dependent on facts, not on value judgments, let alone metaphysical 
Research Methodology in Philosophy within an Interdisciplinary and Commercialised African Context 107 
  
analysis. Thus from the 1850s to the 1970s, the study of politics experienced a 
transition from what the political historians called "traditionalism" to "behaviorism". 
As a result, political philosophy fell into a crisis of knowledge legitimacy (Chen et. 
Al. 2006, 507). In fact, in the 1950s, in Britain and America, political philosophy was 
declared to be dead (de Crespigny and Minogue 1976, p.x). 
 
While political philosophy experienced a revival of credibility through John Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice (1971), it continues to be vigorously attacked by social scientists. 
One of its most articulate challenges is Favell (1998), who questions the approach of 
the renowned Canadian political philosopher, Will Kymlicka, to the issue of minority 
rights. While Favell acknowledges that Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship (1995) 
represents an extraordinary attempt to put applied political philosophy to work in the 
empirical context of contemporary political debates about immigration and ethnic 
minorities in western societies, he contends that there are methodological and 
interpretative difficulties of combining normative and empirical goals as Kymlicka 
does. 
 
Nevertheless, the role of normative reflection such as is carried out in political 
philosophy remains pertinent, because the special concept of value embedded in the 
cultural elements of a body politic inform, and even restrict, its specific policies and 
laws. We therefore not only need to undertake an empirical study of the policies and 
laws actually implemented in a political community (as is done by social scientists), 
but also, as is done by political philosophy, engage in an incisive normative inquiry 
into the value criteria from which these policies and laws are derived (Chen et. Al. 
2006, 511-512). 
 
To our insistence on the need for philosophical reflection on values, Favell (1998, 
275) would reply that a growing body of literature in sociology and political science is 
also addressing normative questions, and developing theoretical ways of combining 
normative and empirical work, suggesting that some important contributions to 
normative theory may indeed come from outside political philosophy in the coming 
years. Nevertheless, as indicated in the previous section, the research methodology of 
philosophy is evidently distinct from that of the social sciences. As such, 
philosophical reflection is likely to yield insights into values that the empirical studies 
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cannot yield. Besides, it is difficult to see how empirical studies of values can proceed 
without the researcher subscribing, implicitly or explicitly, to some normative 
judgments (see Emmet 1966). When, for example, a social scientist is conducting a 
survey on drug abuse in Nairobi, he or she is proceeding on the basis of the value 
judgment that there are ways in which drugs ought not to be used. Why, then, should 
philosophical reflection not be employed to evaluate the rationale for such judgments? 
 
Searle (1999, 2069) asserts that there is no sharp dividing line between science and 
philosophy, but philosophical problems tend to have three special features. First, they 
tend to concern large frameworks rather than specific questions within a framework. 
Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of 
solution. Third, they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these reasons, contends 
Searle, a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scientific 
problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific resolution. Searle goes on 
to assert: 
These features of philosophical questions, that they tend to be 
framework questions and tend not to lend themselves to systematic 
empirical research, explains why science is always 'right' and 
philosophy is always 'wrong'. As soon as we find a systematic way to 
answer a question, and get an answer that all competent investigators 
in the field can agree is the correct answer, we stop calling it 
'philosophical' and start calling it 'scientific' (Searle 1999, 2070). 
 
It is evident that in Searle’s view, philosophy is subordinate to science, as it allegedly 
investigates issues in a less incisive manner than science does, and hands them over to 
science once they can be subjected to systematic empirical research. Yet such a view 
rests on logical positivism’s contested metaphysical postulate that only claims that 
can be verified empirically are meaningful (see 3.2 above). What is more, both the 
history of science and the philosophy of science have plausibly suggested that science 
itself is not “cast in stone”, but is rather in a process of change (see Sarton 1952; Klee 
1997; Rosenberg 2000; Shackelford 2007). Consequently, there is no sufficient 
justification for regarding science as a “perfect” mode of investigation in 
contradistinction to philosophy as Searle seems to do. 
 
Moreover, Searle’s suggestion that it is only a matter of time before all philosophical 
questions move into the realm of science is open to serious challenge. How would 
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philosophical questions such as time and eternity or the holistic understanding of the 
nature of the human person ever become issues for scientific inquiry? Let us, for 
purposes of illustration, focus on the attempt at a holistic understanding of the human 
person: is there any reasonable hope that science will in the foreseeable future 
discover an explanatory principle that integrates the chemical, physical, social, 
psychological and historical aspects of the human person? Although such a discovery 
seems highly unlikely, the human race continues to grope for answers to it, as is 
evident from proposals put forward by various worldviews. By virtue of its reflective 
approach to inquiry, philosophy is uniquely placed to evaluate the answers that 
various worldviews give to pertinent questions concerning the human person, such as 
the following: 
The crucial questions, …, to ask of a worldview are, how does it 
explain the fact that human beings think but think haltingly, love but 
hate too, are creative but also destructive, wise but often foolish, and 
so forth?  What explains our longing for truth or personal fulfillment?  
Why is pleasure as we know it now rarely enough to satisfy 
completely?  Why do we usually want more - more money, more love, 
more ecstasy?  How do we explain our human refusal to operate in an 
amoral fashion? (Sire 1988, 216). 
 
Thus despite the over-arching influence of the social sciences, the need to balance 
experience and reason, truth and value, reality and possibility has led people to tend to 
philosophy again, because after the denial of religious authorities, it is only 
philosophy that shoulders the responsibility for the integrity and unity of knowledge, 
and provides a basis for the justification of the values that give meaning to human 
existence (Chen et. al. 2006, 508). 
 
4.2. A Commercialised Academic Milieu 
During the last fifteen years or so, the market has come into the African academia, 
with the question of demand and supply weighing heavily on institutions of higher 
learning, and specifically on the humanities which are viewed as making no 
contribution to economic development. Students are now referred to as “clients” and 
the academic staff as “service providers”. Thus what Stunkle said in 1989 of the 
American society is probably applicable to a number of African countries today, 
where we have “a public consciousness that views education as a commodity, 
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students as consumers, and professors as producers and purveyors of useful 
information and skills” (Stunkle 1989, 325). 
 
In Kenya, for example, the government has been cutting back on financial support to 
public universities, insisting that they come up with “marketable” academic 
programmes that enable them to cater for the deficit. With its eye firmly on economic 
development, the government has also frequently declared that what the country needs 
is a band of young people trained in the natural sciences, thereby denigrating the 
social sciences and the humanities. Besides, students frequently ask if they will be 
“marketable” if they pursue a degree in philosophy (Oruka 1997, 94-101, 229-230). 
Even more saddening is the fact that African philosophers have often fallen into the 
temptation to pander to such utilitarian demands. The fact that many agencies that 
fund research projects have an explicit bias towards the social sciences has further 
aggravated the situation. 
 
It is evident that philosophy can contribute to economic development. For example, 
Loehle (1988) avered that ecology could profit from the formal tools of philosophical 
inquiry, because the complexity of ecological studies leads to ambiguities and 
interference by the observer's mental framework. 
 
Nevertheless, even where no “direct” benefit of philosophy in the economic and 
political spheres can be pinpointed, the philosopher must not yield to intimidation. 
Our problems are not only economic, but also the lack of qualitative thinking to help 
people get out of their quagmire, a need which philosophy can contribute to meeting 
(Oruka 1997,  214). Besides, as the philosopher does his or her work in the highly 
materialistic contemporary society in which the humanities are often viewed as 
adding little or no value to the GDP and GNP, he or she will do well to remember that 
the abstructions with which philosophy deals were the progenitors of the work now 
being done in the natural and social sciences (Ziman 1968; Bloom 1968, 377). 
 
Even more significant is the fact that any scientific enterprise is underpinned by a 
philosophical orientation (Spirkin 1983). Furthermore, aspects of methodology 
developed in philosophy are general across all sciences and provide tools for problem 
solving in particular disciplines (Loehle 1988, 97). Indeed, the work of some 
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scientists is akin to philosophy, consisting largely of developing concepts and 
theories, with little or no involvement in empirical research. Thus even among 
scientists, the gap has sometimes increased between theorists and empiricists (Nagi 
and Corwin 1972, 16). Moreover, the utility of philosophy in academia should be 
obvious, when we consider that most disciplines use philosophy to gain deeper 
insights into their own areas of specialisation. Thus we have phenomenology of 
religion, philosophy of religion, philosophy of law, philosophy of education, 
philosophy of science, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of language, and 
philosophy of mathematics, among others. 
 
As departments of philosophy around the world have sought to assert their relevance 
in the scrumble for students, they have presented various write-ups on the benefits of 
studying philosophy, many of which are readily available on the Internet. Among the 
benefits that they cite are that interaction with philosophical works helps a person to 
develop a better sense of his or her own values and goals, refines his or her abilities to 
think and communicate, encourages him or her to be more open to experiences in life 
that are especially challenging, and stimulates him or her to be better prepared to 
thoughtfully consider various questions that he or she encounters. Furthermore, many 
philosophy department websites display statistics indicating that philosophy majors 
score consistently higher than students in all other non-scientific disciplines in 
Graduate Record Examinations (GREs) and other standardized exams designed to 
gauge a student's likelihood of success in graduate and professional studies. The 
statistics indicate that philosophy majors also compete favourably with science majors 
in such examinations. 
 
However, the danger of philosophers trying to play the game by the rules of the 
marketplace is that the tangible wares of the applied natural sciences (such as 
agriculture, medicine and information technology), and the “facts and figures” of the 
social sciences are likely to be more appealing to potential “customers” than the 
highly valuable but non-tangible goods of the philosopher. Was it not Plato’s Socrates 
who rejected the entrepreneural outlook of the sophists for the pursuit of insight 
through disinterested contemplation? 
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Perhaps philosophy, and other humanities in Africa today, have something to learn 
from the American experience. According to Allan Bloom's well known but 
controversial book, The Closing of the American Mind (1968), the 1960s were the 
turning point. An influx of minorities and huge general increases in student 
enrollment could not be absorbed by the most rigorous disciplines, notably the natural 
sciences, whose standards were too high and clear. As a result, most of the new 
people, disadvantaged and poor in skills, were shunted into the social sciences, where 
standards were less well articulated, and finally to the bottom of the barrel, the 
humanities, where operational measures of competence were least evident. This led to 
the drastic deterioration in the academic standards of the social sciences and the 
humanities. In the rivalry for second place between the social sciences and the 
humanities, the aura of a scientific approach to issues and the ambience of credibility 
that interest groups enjoyed if they could site social science research in favour of their 
causes worked to the advantage of the social sciences (see Bloom 1968, 351-354). 
Are the “self-sponsored” programmes that mushroomed in African universities over a 
decade ago having a similar effect? 
 
4.3. Preserving the Identity of Philosophy 
In view of the assault on the veracity and relevance of philosophy, it is not surprising 
that Peng and Cheng (2006) contend that in our time, the identity of philosophy has 
already collapsed. For them, it is no longer philosophy that provides stipulations for 
other subjects, but the other subjects that give direction to philosophy. Peng and 
Cheng cite examples of the philosophy of language, structuralism and post-
structuralism, all of which seem to rely on linguistics for guidance. They conclude 
that the boundary of philosophy and non-philosophy is quite uncertain: “A text can be 
philosophical, literary, cultural and even linguistic” (Peng and Cheng 2006, 433). 
While Peng and Cheng’s assertion is an over-statement, it points to what might 
happen in a few decades if scholars of philosophy do not move swiftly to preserve the 
identity of their discipline. 
 
The most effective strategy for the preservation of the identity of a discipline is the 
protection of its methodology. This is due to the fact that subject matter often cuts 
across disciplines. To give a few examples, both the psychologist and the psychiatrist 
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study mental health, both the chemist and the biologist study chemical reactions, and 
both the political scientist and political philosopher study politics. As such, it is 
methodology which distinguishes the disciplines. 
 
Thus scholars of philosophy in Africa today must assert the distinctive methodology 
of their discipline, and on the basis of this assertion seek ways of co-operating with 
practitioners of other disciplines. Wwhile genuine interdisciplinary research might 
yield useful insights for all involved, false interdisciplinarity is a pretext for the 
unjustified exaltation of some disciplines above others. African scholars of 
philosophy must therefore guard against a counterfeit interdisciplinary venture which 
results in philosophy’s loss of identity, and with it the loss of its unique contribution 
to the growth of human knowledge. In the endeavour to stand their ground, they must 
remind thinkers from other disciplines that at least three knowledge types exist: 
empirical knowledge originating basically from observing the world, analytic 
knowledge from rational reflection, and normative knowledge from various theories 
(Chen et. Al. 2006, 512): philosophy contributes to the growth of the second and third 
knowledge types. 
 
What is more, although philosophy is frequently accused of indulging in fruitless 
abstraction, it is a fact that the essence of any research methodology is abstraction: 
… abstractions are an important aspect of method. They are the super-
highways which unite the remotest referents into a meaningful whole. 
Their very abstractness makes it possible to bring objects, acts, events, 
situations of the most varied traits into a common picture, since all 
entities have at least one trait in common: the fact of existence. Being, 
the most abstract of all abstractions, expresses this common Trait 
(Bawden 1944, 490). 
 
Early in this paper, I cited the erroneous insistence by some that there is no distinction 
between philosophy and religious studies. True, interdisciplinary studies should be 
based on the fact that “The faculty of the mind, the power of thinking, is at its seat one 
and undivided. Despite a long tradition that recognizes the diversity of the mind's 
activities and has provided us with polar terms like reason and sensibility, logic and 
intuition, dialectic and poetry, there exists no telling evidence of an essential division 
of thought itself” (Shattuck 1988, 143). Nevertheless, this does not imply that there 
are no distinctions among the disciplines: disciplines are distinguished by subject 
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matter, and more crucially, by methodology. An adequate appreciation of the 
indivisibility of the human mind should lead us to respect the various ways in which 
the mind functions, as indicated by the pairs listed by Shattuck above: those various 
ways point to the diverse methodologies of the disciplines. 
 
The philosopher in Africa today, as elsewhere in the world, must also remind his or 
her potential collaborators in the social sciences that “Recourse to ‘rules of evidence’ 
fails to account for the extent to which the adjudication of claims is a disciplinary 
formation. Not only does each discipline construct its own criteria of proof, but what 
counts as proof is itself contested within, as well as across, disciplines. To understand 
this contest in historical terms is the crux of interdisciplinarity” (Schoenfield and 
Traub 1996, 281). 
 
Above all, in contending for the integrity of the methodology of their discipline, 
philosophers can also point out that even among the social sciences, there is vigorous 
competition: 
Actually each of the social sciences can, and does, make a claim to be 
the beginning point in relation to which the others can be understood - 
economics arguing for the economy or the market, psychology for the 
individual psyche, sociology for society, anthropology for culture, and 
political science for the political order (….) The issue is what is the 
social science atom, and each specialty can argue that the others are 
properly parts of the whole that it represents. Moreover each can 
accuse the other of representing an abstraction, or a construct, or a 
figment of the imagination (Bloom 1968, 359-360). 
This being so, the philosopher has no good reason to defer to a cluster of disciplines 
that are themselves engaged in vigorous debate about their own methodology, 
suggesting the imperfection of their conceptual foundation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The foregoing discussion leads to at least three conclusions. First, as efforts at 
interdisciplinary work continue, scholars must stay alert to the presuppositions that 
underlie each institution's demarcation of the disciplines, in order that, when 
necessary, they may defend the presuppositions or, perhaps, argue for revised, 
institutionally more appropriate definitions (Austin 1996, 273). As Murray (1996, 
280) cautions, the challenge of focused interdisciplinary reciprocity is that such work 
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may alter the foundational assumptions of the fields under consideration; but even 
when welcome alterations result in the definition of evolving disciplinary practices, 
they will not maintain their efficacy without an active dialogue with the historical 
reevaluation of the disciplines from which they emerge. Furthermore, we would 
expect interdisciplinary projects to work best when the goals of each discipline are 
compatible enough to focus research but enough at odds to stimulate new approaches 
to old problems (Henkel 1996, 279). These considerations underscore the importance 
of mutual interdisciplinary respect. 
 
Second, it would be evidently presumptuous for African scholars of philosophy to 
insist that each and every aspect of their subject matter is, and will always be, worth 
pursuing. Nevertheless, the decision as to which branches and sub-branches of 
philosophy are worth investigating must continue to rest with philosophers, because it 
is they who are keenly aware of the history and methodology involved in such 
inquiries. After all, it was Philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer who 
came to the considered, albeit controversial, view that metaphysics had outlived its 
usefulness, if it had any in earlier ages. 
 
Third, since the most vigorous challenge to the methodology of philosophy comes 
from those who idolise the natural and social sciences, it is appropriate to take note of 
Maritain’s outline of the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences: 
… the nature and needs of philosophy make it incumbent upon the 
philosopher to keep himself as fully acquainted as he can With the 
scientific knowledge of his period, provided, however, that he 
preserves intact the freedom of philosophic truth. For though the 
philosopher as such need not use the affirmations of the special 
sciences to establish his own truths, he ought to make use of them, (i) 
to illustrate aptly his principles, (ii) to confirm his conclusions, (iii) to 
interpret, throw light upon, and assimilate, the assured results of the 
sciences so far as questions of philosophy are involved. And finally he 
should use the affirmations of science (iv) to refute objections and 
errors which claim support from its results (Maritain 1979, 91). 
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